Abstract: This article analyzes political participation and the attitudes of Muslim-Americans. Assessing national patterns, the first part highlights several regression models, discerning the impact of race/ethnicity, gender, foreign born status, age, and education on political activity and attitudes.
INTRODUCTION
Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States (Fradkin 2004) and predicted to become the country's second largest by mid-century (Afridi 2001) . 1 Despite Muslims' increasing presence, there is a dearth of scholarship analyzing Muslim-Americans, particularly in the area of political behavior. Utilizing national data and a case study of residents of St. Louis, Missouri, this article fills this research gap by exploring Muslim-Americans' view on politics and patterns of political participation.
Specific questions probed include: How active are Muslims in a variety of political activities? How important is it to them to participate in politics? How often do they keep up with governmental or public affairs? Have levels of political interest and participation declined since September 11 or has this watershed event actually heightened their concern for and engagement with politics? Have patterns of Muslim partisanship changed since September 11? What major differences exist among the main Muslim subgroups -African-Americans, South Asians, and Middle Easterners, in political attitudes and participation? Are there divergences of attitudes and behavior among American born Muslims as opposed to immigrants? Do Muslim women and men hold differing feelings toward politics, exhibit gaps in participation, and support diverse parties? How does Muslim educational status interact with other factors? National data are particularly useful in painting a more representative picture of Muslim political attitudes and participation. Employing several regression models, I measure the impact of race/ethnicity, gender, foreign born status, age, and education on attitudes toward participation and political behavior. While analyzing political changes within the national sample is possible but limited by the data, I probe potential changes in my case study of St. Louis Muslims, having conducted in-person interviews with predominately South Asian, Middle Eastern, Bosnian, and African-American respondents.
As Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States, examination of Muslims' presence in a number of spheres, including the political, is crucial. The post-September 11 climate raises many questions about Muslim prospects for political inclusion. Given the current scrutiny Muslims face both domestically and abroad, they may have negative views on the political sphere and be hesitant to participate. On the other hand, this new reality may push them in the opposite direction, sense of powerlessness shared with other Muslims around the world (Cainkar 2002, 26) . The anti-Islamic domestic and international climate has strengthened this Islamic consciousness, leading to more critical views of treatment.
Both groups have varying experiences with democracy in their home regions. While South Asians have experience with democratic processes, albeit limited in some countries, many Middle Easterners hail from religious theocracies. According to Karen Leonard: These post-1965 Indian and Pakistani Muslim immigrants are conspicuous and powerful in American religious and political arenas. Most of them have been educated in the English language since childhood, and Muslim Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Afghans often have strong religious orientations. Indian Muslims are accustomed to being a minority in a secular democracy and to varying degrees; all South Asians come to the United States with experience in democratic politics, particularly student politics. In contrast, Muslims from most Middle Eastern countries have had little experience with democratic processes. (14) Although much of the Muslim population is foreign born, AfricanAmericans currently comprise the largest portion of MuslimAmericans, representing 30% to 40% of the population. These numbers should continue to rise, since they are the greatest proportion of new converts (Leonard 2003, 5) . Race and class struggles have heavily shaped African-American identity; Islam was an alternative to the Christian and white dominated structure. In contrast to their immigrant counterparts, most African-Americans are converts to Islam, many initially entering as followers of the Nation of Islam. After the death of Elijah Mohammed in 1975, the Nation of Islam established more traditional Islamic structures and practices (Curtis 2002; McCloud 1995 (Ansari 2004; Curtis 2002; McCloud 1995; Nuruddin 1998; Smith 1999) . This new grouping redefined important beliefs in accordance with traditional Islam, but "continued to claim the right to interpret Islam in view of the circumstances in which African-Americans lived, focusing on specifically black issues" (Curtis 2002a, 108) . 2 Followers of Imam Mohammed are the larger portion of the population, but are often marginalized from the immigrant populations, particularly those of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent (Ansari 2004, 260) . According to Karen Leonard, AfricanAmericans have actively pursued some of this disconnection.
The African American Muslim communities remain quite distinctive. . .They often hold ambivalent or antagonistic views toward the U.S. government, Christianity, and other racial or ethnic groups, including Muslim immigrants. Because Islam is seen as a defense against racism, as a new and separate collective identity in the United States, many African American Muslims argue that asabiyaa (group solidarity and experience) must be given priority over umma (the universal Muslim community) at this stage in African American Muslim life. They do not readily accept the customs or authority of immigrant Muslims (Leonard 2003, 9) .
There are also differences in socioeconomic status separating AfricanAmericans from Middle Easterners and South Asians. Generally, African-Americans have lower levels of education and income. Given that Muslim-Americans have clear differences in immigrant status, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic backgrounds, divergent patterns among subgroups are important to understand. Because specific racial and ethnic groups generally dominate mosques, analyzing these three major subgroups is particularly appropriate and is a major emphasis of this article.
In 1999, Project Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS) formed to increase the knowledge base about Muslim-Americans. Research topics include the assimilation experience (Khalidi 2004 ) and the role of African-Americans in Islam (Jackson 2004; Ansari 2004) . Although important, these subjects are very similar to those already established. However, central to this line of research is now the role of Islamic organizations on political participation, focusing on Muslim contributions to American civic life. Research questions explored in this and related articles include whether mosques play an important role in rallying congregations into political action, similar to findings from churches (Verba et al. 1995; Wuthnow 1999) . The participation involved in religious organizations increases various skills, including those useful in civic associations. There appears to be such a relationship between mosque attendance and increased civic participation (Bagby 2004; Jamal 2005) . Regardless of ethnicity, mosque participation is accompanied by greater civic involvement such as working with
The Politics of Muslims in America 167 organizations helping the poor and participation with neighborhood or community groups (Jamal 2005, 531) . Beyond the mosque, Muslim organizations are increasingly visible, particularly since the September 11 attacks. Some of these organizations are mobilizing members into political action; the Muslim-American Society (MAS) registers voters at annual meetings (Nimer 2004) . Organization leaders also encourage greater political participation (Afridi 2001) . Muslims are forming political organizations, and increasingly contributing financially to candidates individually and as part of political action committees, such as MPAC (Afridi 2001; Nimer 2004 ). Moreover, September 11 has led Muslims to reevaluate many political issues (Leonard 2001) . By contrast, very little work dealing specifically with individual political behavior has been conducted. Findings from this literature will be used in constructing various hypotheses, detailed subsequently.
Headway has also been made in the systematic examination of Muslim-American attitudes and political behavior. Various commercial polling firms have led the way in this endeavor. Project MAPS through Zogby International conducted the first major scientific poll dealing with attitudes of Muslim-Americans in 2001, reporting data on demographics, religious practices, political opinions, and participation. A second survey was carried out just prior to the 2004 presidential election. In 2007, the Pew Research Center surveyed Muslims worldwide, including Americans. Taken together, these are important breakthroughs. Because of its wider array of political questions to draw from relative to Pew, the 2004 Zogby data is utilized in this study to examine national patterns of Muslim attitudes and behavior. However, by incorporating a qualitative case study, this work more directly assesses shifts in political behavior and explores reasons for these movements. It goes beyond asking what changes occurred, focusing on why, highlighting rather than obscuring differences among Muslims.
Because of the negative attention and policies directed toward Muslims since September 11 and the ongoing military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, Muslim-Americans may feel somewhat pessimistic about the current political situation. While this may cause some to retreat from politics, the context may inspire others to care more about politics and heighten their political engagement. However, given their diverse populations, differences among Muslim-Americans are likely.
As noted earlier, Middle Easterners and South Asians have different levels of exposure to democratic politics in their home countries. There are two possible implications of this for participation. With greater exposure to democratic practices, South Asian immigrants may be more habituated to political processes and participatory than Middle Easterners. However, this might instead cause political participation to be taken for granted and lead to greater apathy for South Asians. Similarly, having less democratic exposure in their homelands, Middle Eastern immigrants may be hesitant to partake in politics in their adopted countries as research on various immigrants from similar contexts finds (Bueker 2005; Ramakrishnan 2005 ). But how do homeland experiences impact those operating in a new country, particularly in the political realm?
According to the theory of transferability, immigrants are highly affected by past experiences in their homelands as they operate within new environments (Black, Niemi, and, Powell 1987) . The specific contexts to which immigrants move are not as important as their predispositions toward politics in their native lands. This suggests greater potential ease in adaptation: "greater exposure to any political environment (new or old) makes it easier to engage in politics; individuals find ways to effectively draw on the political skills developed in different environments" (White et al. 2008) .
Other research centered on the exposure theory of political socialization downplays the impact of origin while arguing that it is greater exposure to the host country that is particularly important for determining political effects on immigrant groups. One's superior ability to adapt coincides with residing in the new country longer. For example, some scholarship finds that turnout increases with the numbers of years spent in the United States (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001) . Years in the country also appears to affect partisanship. The longer immigrants from Latin America are in the United States, the more apt they are to be strong Democrats, while those from Southeast Asia, China, and Korea are more likely to be Republicans (Cain, Kiewet, and Uhlaner 1991) .
Resistance theory, in contrast to the above, argues that adaptation is very difficult for immigrants because most political orientations are formed at earlier ages and are resistant to change (Merelman 1986) . Resistance is particularly likely the longer one lives in one's own home country (White et al. 2008) .
In a study of diverse immigrant groups in Canada, White et al. (2008) argue that these differing theories apply to specific types of political attitudes and behavior. Evidence indicates that political transference is key to understanding political interest. If one paid attention to politics in one's The Politics of Muslims in America 169 own home country, one would be likely to do so also in one's new country and vice versa (276). However, both voting and partisanship offer support for the exposure hypothesis. These relatively more demanding processes require more knowledge of and habituation to the particular context (White et al. 2008, 277) . Only the resistance hypothesis does not appear to be at work among these three. In fact, years of living in one's country of origin is inconsequential (White et al. 2008, 277) . The above highlights the importance of transferring political interest while greater exposure to the United States is helpful to developing partisanship and participating in politics. But how will ethnicity and race interact with this? Evidence of exposure is clear among all subgroups in that the American-born Muslim population is more apt to participate in the civic realm than those born abroad (Bagby 2004) . However, mosque participation is only linked to greater political involvement for ArabAmericans, and not for South Asians and African-Americans (Jamal 2005, 529) . American foreign policy toward the Middle East has been an enduring issue and even more salient since September 11. Due to their closer associations with negative stereotypes and terrorist depictions, Middle Easterners may have a more negative view of their current status in America and see this less favorably than South Asians (Schmidt 2004, 4) . Together, these factors may actually lead them to be more politically aware and actively change policy (Jamal 2005) . Because they are not immigrants in the same sense that Middle Easterners and South Asians are, African-Americans will not have the added pull between old and new worlds. However, because they were drawn to Islam as a source of empowerment in response to racism and simultaneously experience marginalization from Muslim immigrant groups, these experiences could foster African-American group consciousness while hampering development of political interest and mobilization, a very different pattern from what is found in black churches (Jamal 2005, 536) . In his pivotal study of Detroit Muslims, Bagby (2004) finds that Arabs were the most politically active among subgroups, while African-Americans were the least supportive of participation.
Although analyzing subgroups is still crucial, there are compelling reasons to expect a general increase in political participation of American-Muslims in this post September 11 environment. According to affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al. 2000) , anxiety and alienation result in greater political awareness and political participation. Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) The development of partisanship is important and potential shifts particularly interesting in the post September 11 context. Partisanship is generally defined as someone's affective attachment to a particular political party (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002) . Partisanship is important because it is the single biggest predictor of the vote, it influences views on policy, and those with partisan identities are more interested and participatory (Erikson and Tedin 2007) . A major debate is whether partisanship remains relatively unchanged over one's life (Campbell et al. 1960) , or if it shifts in response to candidate and other short-term evaluations and events, vote choices in presidential elections, and issue positions (Fiorina 1981) . Although it is one of the most enduring attitudes, there is in fact much literature finding fluctuations in partisanship (Fiorina 1981; Green and Palmquist 1990; Jennings and Markus 1984) . The potential for understanding partisanship is particularly ripe among Muslim-Americans since there are several factors that may pressure them to alter their attachment to parties.
Muslim political mobilization generally dates back to the 1996 election. Debates centered on whether or not participation in the American democratic process was in accordance with Islamic principles (Duran 1997) , ultimately fostering political discourse among MuslimAmericans. Less successful were attempts at coalescing around either Bob Dole or Bill Clinton (Duran 1997) . However, fallout from this lack of unity in 1996 set the stage for the first Muslim bloc vote in 2000. Having largely set aside the appropriateness of participation, questions instead surrounded who would best represent Muslim political interests. A coalition of Muslim organizations formed the American Muslim Political Coordination Committee (AMPCC), endorsing George W. Bush. According to the organization head "Governor Bush took the initiative to meet with local and national representatives of the Muslim community. He also promised to address Muslim concerns on domestic and foreign policy issues." 3 Other factors reportedly pivotal to Bush's support were Gore's strong support for Israel and his selection of a strong ally of Israel, Joseph Lieberman, as his running mate (Rose 2001) . However, the endorsement of Bush met much resistance by African-Americans, who as committed Democrats felt further alienated from immigrant Muslim groups (Khan 2003) . Whether or not this bloc mobilization was responsible, according to a Zogby poll, Bush support among Muslims in 2000 was 42% and Gore 31%. Candidate recruitment and voting drives were somewhat successful while fundraising efforts were largely deemed a failure (Khan 2003) .
Much changed by the 2004 election. Many viewed the Muslim bloc vote for Bush as a mistake, given the restrictive policies facing Muslims both domestically and abroad including the War on Terror and military conflicts against Muslims around the world. This caused many to reevaluate their place in the political sphere and which party, if any, could best further Muslim interests. A collection of 10 American-Muslim organizations, the American-Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections (AMT), now endorsed John Kerry (Poole and Ali 2005) . This was coupled with successful mobilization efforts, resulting in a 20% increase in Muslim-American registered voters (Poole and Ali 2005) . A major shift in both partisanship and vote choice was indeed apparent. The Zogby 2004 survey found a clear backing of Kerry (76%) over Bush (7%) at the polls. 4 Some 50% considered themselves Democrats, 12% Republican, and 31% Independent or other. 5 In fact, Democratic partisans increased by 25% while Republican support greatly dwindled compared to 2001 findings. 6 However, how shifts differed among various subgroups as well as relevant causes need to be better understood. This is a major goal of this article.
I expect Muslims have largely switched partisanship to the Democratic Party since September 11. Others who have changed have gone from being Republicans to having no partisan affiliations. In both cases, these modifications are mainly due to feelings that Muslims have been negatively targeted through policies associated with the War on Terror and the Iraq War. Because Muslims are not a monolith, differences are salient. For example, while South Asians and Middle Easterners generally supported the Republican Party in 2000 (Rose 2001) , they may be the biggest partisan shifters. Because systematic analyses of MuslimAmericans have only recently been undertaken in survey research, it is not possible to position these recent changes in a long-term perspective. 7 However their relatively high socioeconomic statuses and conservative religious affiliations likely pulled them toward the Republican Party; this is particularly true of South Asians. 8 As African-Americans were strong supporters of the Democratic Party prior to this (Carmines and Stimson 1989) partisanship, changes will not be evidenced. Although the national sample of Bosnian-Muslims is too low to systematically analyze, I incorporate Bosnians in my case study. Since Bosnian-Muslims of voting age are nearly all foreign born and recent immigrants, they will not yet have developed strong party connections and thus not changed partisanship. However, Bosnians in the United States for longer periods may become Democrats. The resettlement program that brought large numbers of Bosnians to St. Louis functioned under Clinton's administration. 9 Since Bosnians are privileged by race, they may not experience overt religious discrimination. Because of their experiences with religious persecution in the former Yugoslavia, religious discrimination in the United States may not have much of a political impact.
Beyond race and ethnicity, the exposure hypothesis underscores the importance of familiarity within the context of the country among immigrants for participation and partisanship. The American born and immigrants living in the United States longer will be more likely to participate in American politics than others because of greater acclimation. Women's political participation and interest are likely to be lower than men's, due primarily to conservative notions of women's proper role within Muslim communities and their household responsibilities, although this will vary with race, ethnicity, and generation.
NATIONAL FINDINGS
I analyze data compiled in a Zogby International telephone survey from a random sample of 1,846 Muslims living in the United States. 10 Before proceeding, a word about the sample selection is in order. Sampling lists were generated from lists of common Muslim surnames. 11 As mentioned previously, although imperfect, since it bypasses those who lack traditional Muslim surnames, Zogby compensates for this by also including an over-sample of African-American-Muslims interviewed at mosques. African-Americans are particularly hard to sample because many are converts and generally unidentifiable as Muslims by name. 12 The overall margin of error is + 2.3% and higher for subgroups. A weight variable provides a slight correction to make ethnic groups more proportional to their representation in the larger population.
I first examine Muslim-American participation in various political activities, followed by their political interest and attentiveness to governmental affairs, partisanship, and vote choice in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. These all comprise separate regression models. Since nearly all are coded as dichotomous dependent variables, logistical regression is utilized. The exceptions are discussing politics, importance of politics, and following politics. Linear regression is employed in these three cases. My main independent variables are gender, ethnicity/race, age, United States born status, and education. I do not include income because a large number of respondents refuse to disclose this information and because it highly correlates with education. I also am unable to incorporate a variable for years in the United States because including this would drop American-born respondents from the sample (Tables 1 and 2) .
When asked if they are active members of their party, the only statistically significant variables are African-American and foreign born status. As expected, those born in the United States are more likely to participate in party activities while African-Americans are less so. However, African-Americans are more apt to attend a rally in support of a politician or a cause, along with the United States born, and those who are more highly educated. However, being South Asian is significantly related to not attending political rallies. They are also less inclined to call or write the media or politician about an issue or sign a petition while the American-born and more educated do engage in these activities at a higher rate. The American-born and highly educated are also more prone to contribute financially or work on behalf of a candidate, which is also the case for older respondents. However, African-Americans are less apt to do so than other subgroups. While gender has thus far been unrelated to any forms of participation, it is significantly related to navigating political websites. Women are less prone to engage in this activity, which is also the case for South Asians and African-Americans. However, the American-born, educated, and younger respondents are significantly more inclined to do so than any subgroups. Political discussion is only significant for three groups; Middle Easterners, United States born, and educated, who discuss politics on a more frequent basis.
Beyond specific forms of activity, it is also important to understand the significance of politics to one's life and the extent to which they follow governmental and public affairs. Interestingly, younger respondents place more emphasis on politics than their older counterparts. However, they follow politics significantly less as do women and South Asians. The American-born and educated are more prone to tap into news of governmental and public affairs (Table 3) .
To understand the role of party affiliation, I develop two models. The first analyzes only respondents affiliating with either the Republican or Overall, results for political participation indicate that there are few differences between women and men; women are only less likely to navigate political websites but engage in all other forms of activity on a similar basis as men. This stands in contrast to the larger American population where, except for voting, women tend to lag behind men in many forms of participation (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 2005) . Given dominant views about the relative dominance of men over women in Muslim communities, this is an interesting finding. However, women do not follow political news as frequently as men. While perhaps unsurprising, education is nearly consistently associated with all political activities; the more highly educated are in a better position to navigate political waters and play a more active role in the political sphere. Older respondents are also generally more participatory than their younger counterparts, similar to findings among other groups (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 2007) . Almost without exception, whether one is born in the United States or abroad is pivotal: native born respondents have more potential exposure to American political processes, ultimately paying attention to and participating more in politics, confirming the exposure hypothesis. The only variable not significantly related to United States born status is importance of politics. Because this is closely linked to political interest, this null finding may be in line with the transferability hypothesis-political interest is less related to exposure to a new political system but more connected to the immigrants' interest developed in their homelands.
Middle Easterners are more prone to discuss politics on a frequent basis. However, being Middle Eastern has no relationship to any other activity or attitude analyzed thus far. On a nearly consistent basis, South Asians are the least participatory of ethnic/racial subgroups in rally attendance, media writing and petition singing, navigating political websites and following politics. While South Asians are generally well educated, this does not translate into political participation. AfricanAmericans also lag behind in various forms of activity, specifically party and candidate work and navigating political websites. The one exception is their heightened participation in political rallies. While speculative, participation may be more geared toward racial consciousness raising activities or community crime prevention rather than support for specific political candidates. Findings for South Asians and African-Americans in this sample are generally consistent with those offered by Jamal (2005) .
Analyzing partisanship and candidate choice reveal interesting patterns. Here gender is almost consistently a factor, as opposed to political participation. Generally, gender differences coincide with those evident within the larger population. Therefore, any gender gaps are not specific to Muslim-Americans but part of more general patterns. In 2000, AfricanAmericans were clear supporters of Democratic candidate Al Gore while South Asians and Middle Easterners voted for Republican George W. Bush. However, four years later, among this same sample, race and ethnic divisions are no longer apparent-instead, all these major subgroups generally voted for the Democratic candidate. Also important, partisanship is not related to race and ethnicity. This raises the possibility that partisanship has at least temporarily shifted among South Asian and Middle-Eastern Muslims, although this is impossible to confirm with these data. While findings are very instructive, turning to the case study will allow for some preliminary assessments regarding other potential changes since September 11 and reasons behind these shifts.
LOCAL FINDINGS-MUSLIMS IN ST. LOUIS
St. Louis is an ideal setting because of its large and diverse Muslim population and it has not yet been the subject of scholarly research. 13 The Muslim population in greater St. Louis is approximately 70,000. 14 There is great ethnic and racial diversity in the population, including people of Bosnian, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African descent as well as African-Americans. I conducted in-person interviews with members of four mosques: two predominately South Asian and Middle Eastern (Gateway Masjid, Daar-ul-Islam), a Bosnian (Madina Masjid) and an African-American mosque (Masjid al Muminoon). 15 Although I have a small sample (n ¼ 45), it is very diverse and large enough to explore questions lingering from more representative surveys. Beyond interviews, I also observed mosque lectures and special programs and participated in prayer services generally over a period of approximately six weeks per mosque, and interacted with congregations and leadership. 16 A major concern is when and why transformations occurred, particularly among formerly strong Republicans, including a Lebanese man, who said: I consider myself a conservative and I believe in their (Republican) agenda and their platform as far as local issues. However I disagree with them on foreign policy. And I joined them hoping to change some of their understanding of my concern with the Middle East. . .I was a member of the___Township Republican Organization and was also a member of the___Republican Organization. I attended their meeting monthly. And I quit. No longer, I am rehabilitated.
Shifting after September 11, this centered on foreign policy and Iraq War: "I think his (Bush's) agenda is domination and taking advantage of third world countries and people and resources. So, I think Bush is taking our country here in the wrong direction and I did not want him in the office."
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An Indian man offers a slightly different assessment regarding why he switched from strong Republican to Democrat: "I don't know if it was because of September 11 or just the people who were in office but their views did not jibe with my view of what the Republican Party was." He notes that this change was not in response to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, "The September 11 masterminds were apparently protected by the government in Afghanistan. That government didn't want to turn people over and so you couldn't expect the United States to do nothing. They had to do what they did."
A Pakistani male in America just six years presents this appraisal:
When I first came here I was a very conservative Muslim. Good boy. And I went from there. I had no party affiliation. It took me a couple of years to figure it out, and then I decided Republican. Women also acknowledge a shift in partisan allegiances but are not as forthcoming about why. An Indian woman states "I switched from Republican to Democrat after September 11. I didn't like where the Republican Party was going." One African-American respondent switched from Democrat to Republican 10 years ago. Other than this, changes in partisanship since September 11 are limited to South Asians and Middle Easterners. Shifts began mainly in response to foreign policy but also due to perceptions that the Republican Party was increasingly inflexible. While many originally supported the Republican Party because of more socially conservative stances, this eroded. Rather than interpreting this as overwhelming Democratic support, there is still a large portion of independents in this sample. Shifts from Republican to Democratic support and large portions of independents are both reinforced by national surveys. Current Democratic support among former Republicans often lacks enthusiasm and may be fleeting. Conceivably, if a Republican candidate supported a different foreign policy, he or she could win the non-AfricanAmerican-Muslim vote. Although some voted Republican as recently as the 2004 election, only two respondent are self-classified Republican.
All but one African-American are Democrats and their affiliations are stable. Among Bosnians, only one is a partisan. Apart from this Democratic man, most Bosnians do not discern party differences. A Bosnian woman originally categorizing herself as a Democrat explains, In terms of political ideology, responses vary tremendously. Many are liberal (33%) or moderate (31%) while fewer are conservative (20%). A handful (9%) are unsure or have not thought much about ideology and are mainly recent immigrants, particularly Bosnians. Finally, for 7%, ideology depends on particular policies. They are perhaps liberal on social welfare but conservative on reproductive issues or gay rights. Even those on one end of the spectrum believe in the issue dependency of ideology. For example, a young Pakistani asserts: "Some issues I'm conservative on, some liberal. Same-sex marriage I'd lean more toward conservative but more liberal in the sense of like the strictness of practicing religion." A Syrian woman adds: "It depends on the issue. On social issues, on family values, corporal punishment, and abortion, I agree with conservatives more, but not how they go about it. I am more liberal on foreign affairs." She notes that whereas she can pass values onto her daughters, she has no power over foreign affairs. While some report ideological shifts, all but five confirm ideological stability in contrast to partisanship. The direction of change is mixed.
Two important questions are whether greater social welfare liberalism combined with moral conservatism among this local sample also extends to Muslims nationally, and if this differs from the general American population. It appears that the answer to both questions is yes. One of the major findings from the 2007 Pew Report is that Muslims are relatively unique compared to the general public in their high degrees of liberalism on social welfare while being very conservative on issues of morality such as gay rights. 20 Turning to basic political predispositions, responses are closely distributed between those uninterested in politics (15% or 33%), somewhat (14% or 31%), and very (16% or 36%). 15 (33%) believe political participation is very important, 16 (36%) somewhat, and 14 (31%) not important. Again, all but one Bosnian consistently lack political interest: "Honestly, I'm not interested in politics at all. I don't have the time." Another responds: "I've been here for four years and I really don't know American politics. I might become interested at some time in the future.
But not yet because I really don't have time." This is not limited to Bosnians. Many say lack of citizenship makes it difficult to value participation. "It's not very important to me to participate because I'm not a citizen right now. I think my input is not as valuable."
Has political interest among Muslims changed? Most (24) say no. Generally, those very interested in politics have been so engrossed since adulthood and, if foreign born, were interested in politics in their homelands. Still 21 register a change with 17 increasingly interested. Many state that, since September 11, Muslims cannot help becoming more engrossed. Others cite interest increases with age, or as a result of American acclimation. Only four report declining interest, also mentioning the post September 11 context. A Syrian woman discussed her transformation: I used to be really interested in politics, and especially right after September 11. But then there was a kind of disappointment that things really don't change. . . How was I going to change things? Others have tried before, and I figured that I could spend my energy on other things and that led me closer to Islam.
Most keep-up with politics either occasionally (17) or most of the time (24). Very few rarely keep-up with public affairs (4). Generally, those interested in politics follow public affairs. Those whose political interest increased often follow the news closer, although exceptions exist: A Pakistani woman expresses dissatisfaction with the media portrayals of Muslims: "Ever since September 11, I don't watch the news because I think it is just lies." However, her political interest has increased. "I'm probably more concerned with situations well like atrocities that go on in Bosnia, you know Congo, Iraq." Many also keep-up with news from their homelands on the internet or satellite television.
Middle Easterners, South Asians, and African-Americans typically are somewhat interested or very interested in politics. Two believe Islam leaves no room for politics. "Leave that (politics) to the politicians. I mean I study Islam. I'm trying to get closer to my Lord. If I ever get to the point where politics has to play a role in that I will, but now I'm just trying to memorize Koran and be a good Muslim." The other declares that although a past voter, he no longer participates in politics and just concentrates on religion. Both are white male converts to Islam. Again, this is a minority view.
Probing political participation in numerous activities, most engage in political discussion with family or friends at least sometimes (23) or often (10). Only 12 never or rarely discuss politics, some saying it is a waste of time or they do not know enough. Those interested in politics are more likely to discuss it. There is a gender gap in political discussion with men nearly twice as likely to discuss politics frequently as women. 21 Overall, 24 (53%) have attended a political meeting, 18 a political rally (40%), and 22 (49%) a demonstration. 22 Far fewer have worked for a political party or candidate nine (20%) and 14 (31%), respectively, almost all affiliated with the Democratic Party. Only nine (20%) wore a campaign button, five (11%) had a campaign sticker on their car, and 10 (22%) placed a campaign sign in their yard. 13 (29%) donated money to a candidate (nearly all Democrats) and 19 (42%) to a political party (again, nearly all to the Democrat Party). Many began financially contributing to politics only after September 11. 12 (27%) contacted the media and 19 (42%) public officials about a political issue, some directly and others through organizations like Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR). Men are more likely to engage in these activities than women, although some women are still quite politically active. South Asian, Middle Easterners, and African-Americans more often participate politically than Bosnians who tend not to have citizenship. Many respondents note a greater inclination to participate in the last few years. For example, an Indian woman became a Democratic delegate to the 2004 convention, although previously was an independent: "With the last election, I thought I just couldn't sit back and lose hope. Defeating Bush was a priority and that's when I started going to meetings and got elected as a delegate and got other Muslims involved."
Before discussing voting results, two caveats are in order. Eight could not vote because they were not citizens. 23 Another is on probation from federal prison. All others were registered to vote. Of the 33 registered to vote for the 2004 elections (one was not yet 18 by that time and another was not yet a citizen), three did not vote (two women of Bosnian descent and a woman originally from Somalia). Three women of diverse nationalities refused to disclose their vote choice. Of the 27 revealing their vote choice, the vast majority (23 or 85%) voted for Kerry while only four (15%) voted for Bush. Below are typical responses from Kerry voters:
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"Kerry, because he was better than the alternative."
"Kerry. I felt like I appreciated where he was standing for more. How he didn't believe in the war." "I thought Bush was terrible. It was an anti-Bush vote. It's not that I like Kerry. That's my frustration is that I don't like the Democrats much. . .It was the lesser of two evils. I seriously considered giving my vote to a third party candidate but I thought that was kind of a waste."
Thus, many Democratic voters did so less for Kerry and more against Bush. It can hardly be seen as a ringing endorsement for the Democratic Party. 24 Although clearly in the minority, some Muslims supported Bush in 2004. A Pakistani woman did, but not of her own accord. "My husband requested that I did. And the other candidate we found was not as strong." A Pakistani male physician and long term Republican thinks Bush is honest, generally supporting him. Furthermore, he dislikes Edward's work as a medical legal plaintiff lawyer. This was mentioned by other South Asian physicians, who, although Kerry voters, were bothered by his running mate's suing medical professionals. A female physician with a mixed voting record voted for Bush "because I couldn't decide between the both of them -they're both equally bad." However, she will likely vote Democrat in the next election. Finally, a very committed African-American Republican voted Bush because he supports his accomplishments.
It is instructive to discuss evidence of the Muslim voting bloc for Bush in 2000. Were St. Louis Muslims aware of this bloc? Did local communities vote as one? I asked respondents whether they were mobilized to vote Republican by mosques, organizations, or communities in 2000. Only South Asian and Middle Eastern respondents were aware of the Bush bloc. African-Americans were unaware probably because of their strong Democratic ties. Also, since few Bosnians were registered voters, they were not attentive to this. 25 Thirty-one (69%) said being Muslim affects how they vote to some extent while 10 said no, and four did not know. 27 Several thought being Muslim is tremendously influential: "Do they (candidates) even listen to Muslims and are they willing to let Muslims work on their campaign and are they willing to give them any influential positions? That to me makes a difference." "Any candidate who is anti-Islam or Muslim, will make me think negatively of him and if he doesn't have an open mind and understanding of the Muslim Community here, I will not vote for him."
While some acknowledge this effect, it depends on the office with Muslim identity prominent in national elections, but less so as politics becomes local. When discussing policy issues, many reason through their opinions referencing Islamic teachings. Still, a few believe being Muslim had no bearing on their politics. "I don't think our religion limits us in making choices as far as voting for different people."
The vast majority indeed have been affected personally and politically by September 11 (78% and 69%, respectively). Personally, some are more religious. A few women started wearing hijab to disprove Muslim stereotypes. As one woman noted, Politically, most have heightened political interest and activity: "I think September 11 made Muslims realize how absolutely vulnerable they are and how they have absolutely no voice in the political system or in the media or in academics. My view of Muslims basically is that you do your job and then you go to the mosque, basically the triangle where Muslims live. . .Now because of September 11 people realized how absolutely vulnerable they are and I think that some of the cowards left the country and ran away but the ones who stayed behind I think at the very least are trying to have financial involvement, put up a yard sign, or volunteer at a PBS drive." "Yeah. I think I got more involved. Not because of September 11 but because there were groups in our country that wanted to isolate Muslims and I think we were starting to become a cohesive voice, not any big voice, but we were getting a little bit of political strength and clout." "I'm much more vocal about things. I used to not talk about it so much. That's how I was raised. It's wrong not to do that. We as Muslims have an obligation. Wherever I go, I'm a Muslim; I represent the Islamic community much more. Before I was dormant. But being quiet is a luxury."
As noted, several cite post-September 11 politics as the reason they switched from Republican to Democrat. Very few note decreased activity while some find no impact, sometimes because they were already vigorous: "Well it hasn't affected me politically before because I was strongly involved still."
Several are victims of religious discrimination personally, or know friends or family who are. More were aware of others who had been discriminated against than had experienced it directly (67% versus 51%). Those encountering discrimination include unfair treatment at work and verbal harassment in public spaces. Some of the most direct accounts are discussed by Middle Eastern-Americans: "I was manager of an office of seven employees. Right away (after September 11) they started posting flyers on bulletin board against Muslims, against people like me. . . We should annihilate them all. I complained to my superiors and they didn't do anything about it. There were more flyers directed toward me personally saying when are you going to leave this office, we don't want you around. People like you aren't welcome here." "I just feel people are more cautious than they were before around Muslims you know. I'm sure internally they have negative feelings but they cannot come out and say anything. They probably hold a grudge against us for what happened." Some mentioned being told in grocery stores, "Hey go back to your own country." Muslim women wearing the headscarf, or hijab, are particularly vulnerable to this. While some women mentioned that they did not start wearing a hijab until after the attacks, one has gone back and forth on the The Politics of Muslims in Americadecision and has, for now, decided not to because she felt discriminated against. Many experiencing subtle discrimination, like stares at grocery stores or on the streets, downplay it, sometimes thinking: "It could all be in my head." Several note repeated troubles traveling by air, making a direct connection to their Muslim identities. Muslim discrimination, according to the President of CAIR-St. Louis is definitely more widespread since September 11, including St. Louis. Anecdotal evidence confirms this as do findings from larger surveys of Muslims.
Religious discrimination is rarely cited by African-Americans, although one states she was a victim of religious discrimination, possibly due to her wearing hijab. Although several Bosnians were discriminated against, they put this in a larger perspective: "In high school there were a lot of comments about Muslims, like you know, 'get out of here.' It doesn't matter, I've lived through worse."
Although some analysis on the effect of views on the War on Terror on partisanship has already been provided, a more general treatment of opinions on foreign military engagement is in order. Some 71% oppose the United States involvement in Afghanistan. Many do not feel like there were close connections between Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks to warrant invasion. Below are typical responses:
"How many Afghanis were on that plane?" "I am under the impression that our interests in the Mideast or in the Afghanistan area are not really as pure." Several voice conflicting feelings about the issue or don't know how they feel; some experienced a change of heart: "Initially I did (support it). It was right after September 11 and Osama Bin Laden was supposed to be there. But we're not doing much to be there. What good is it?" Only four (9%) support the mission: "the Taliban is not the answer. Women need an education and help with oppression from the ultraconservative right." Twenty percent say support is dependent on various factors or are unsure. While there is more ambivalence about Afghanistan, the Iraq War is opposed by nearly everyone, with only two supporting it, both Republicans. Although 93% oppose it, several mention they're happy that Saddam Hussein was deposed, but question United States' authority to remove him and the handling of the war. 28 "I think it (the Iraq War) was based on a lot of misinformation. . . There was never a link between Al Quaeda and Iraq." "No weapons were there." While Bosnian respondents voice little about politics, often claiming they have no knowledge or interest, they uniformly express dissatisfaction with both conflicts, relating personal war experiences:
The only thing I don't like about the way the war is handled is that innocent people died. And we had a war back in Bosnia and most of my family members died. Innocent people. . .I don't know why, you know, why can't they go and resolve that between them, the politicians, and not involve innocent people. . .That's the only thing. People are dying for no reason. I don't like that.
This low support for Republican initiated policies is likely strongly associated with partisan switching and also a general opposition to the Republican Party as evidenced prior. Many cite disappointment with Bush's entry into Iraq, general foreign policy, and treatment of Muslims domestically and abroad. The war is repeatedly cited as the most important issue America faces while Muslim discrimination is the biggest problem Muslims encounter.
Findings from the qualitative study reinforce some findings from the quantitative analysis. In contrast, Bosnians are not yet acclimated to the American political system and tend to be apolitical. There is no clear pattern of partisanship. However, there is also evidence that when Bosnians have been in the United States longer and are more Americanized, they become more political, and take on Democratic affiliations. For example, the lone politically attuned Bosnian respondent has been in the United States for nearly a decade and has a high level of education compared to other Bosnians. Therefore, Bosnians living in the United States longer and generally more acclimated and educated may be Democratic affiliates for Interestingly, responses do not indicate that the conflict in Afghanistan is responsible for changes. Regardless of specific partisan shifts, the vast majority have been affected personally and politically by September 11. Also important is the fact that nearly half cite heightened interest in politics and several note a greater inclination to participate in the last few years. Only a handful have become less concerned with politics. Their actions correspond with this. Nearly all who were eligible to vote voted in the 2004 presidential elections. They also have high rates of participation in various other political activities including rally attendance, donating money to candidates, and discussing politics. Therefore, regardless of the hardships they may currently feel, Muslim-Americans are not hiding in the shadows, but are highly visible as participants in the political sphere. Gender differences are more prominent than found in the national sample-fewer women tend to participate in political activity than men, although differences are generally small.
DISCUSSION
Overall, both the quantitative and qualitative analyses illustrate that Muslim-Americans are heavily participating in politics and generally value the importance of politics. Their presence in the political sphere has actually increased since September 11. Whether or not this is indeed a direct result over fears of Muslim persecution is still in question, although findings are in line with this possibility. Furthermore, they vote according to what they perceive their interests as Muslims are. Currently, this entails supporting Democratic candidates and adopting Democratic partisan affiliations. While this is not new for African-Americans, this is a departure for many South Asians and Middle Easterners. Overall, it is crucial to treat Muslim-Americans as diverse subgroups -they are not a monolith.
One of the most important factors to take into account when dealing with political attitudes and participation is whether respondents are born in the United States. Those who are from the United States originally are generally more participatory, which could be linked to greater exposure to American politics. Being more educated is also important for political participation and the development of various attitudes that correspond with both Democratic support and voting records. Gender generally operates similarly among Muslim-Americans as it does within the larger society, although there are fewer gender gaps in behavior among Muslim-Americans. While larger differences in participation between women and men are clear in the qualitative analysis, these are still relatively slight.
What do these results mean for the future of Muslims and politics in America? While it is tempting to conclude that recent changes in political interest, partisanship, and vote choice will continue, this is not at all certain. While there are clear differences in partisanship and voting among South Asians and Middle Easterners between the 2000 and 2004 elections, data prior to 1996 is non-existent. This raises the possibility that these groups were not necessarily always strong advocates of the Republican Party or candidates prior to September 11. Even if they were, changes in 2004 may be short lived. However, it is reasonable to assume that Muslim Democratic support will continue through at least the 2008 election given the respective stances of the party nominees.
As the population of Muslim voters continues to grow, it would be in both parties interest to pay more attention to these increasingly important groups, who, although hardly a monolith, are beginning to speak in a more unified voice and voting as a bloc. While their overall population in the United States is only about 2%, and is highest in traditionally Democratic states like California, New York, and New Jersey, Muslims have the potential to make a political impact in swing states such as Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio where they are also heavily concentrated (Kosmin and Lachman 1993) . Given that election outcomes have been extremely close in the 2000 and 2004 contests, if even half of Michigan's Muslim population of 2% turns out to vote, and largely vote Democratic, this could make the difference in 2008.
